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LIMITING PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL: HUTCHINSON V. PEOPLE
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment examines the Colorado Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Hutchinson v. People. ' Part I of the Comment addresses the facts
of the case. Part II then explores the background out of which the legal
issues of the case arise. Part III addresses the reasoning adopted by the
court, and Part IV focuses upon a general analysis of the court's deci-
sion. While reference is made to a variety of sources, such as the Rules
of Criminal Procedure and leading United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, particular emphasis is placed on Colorado law.
I. FACTS
In Hutchinson, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
view the defendant's convictions for second-degree forgery and conspir-
acy to commit second-degree forgery. 2  The charges against the
defendant arose when he obtained deposit slips from a bank and then
allegedly forged the writing on two checks which he presented for pay-
ment twice. The defendant denied that he wrote the checks or knew that
they were invalid. Hence, a critical issue in the case involved the identity
of the person who wrote the checks and the deposit slips.
3
The defense was permitted to retain, at state expense, a handwrit-
ing expert who conducted an independent analysis of the handwriting
evidence. The expert's findings were generally unfavorable to the de-
fendant's case, and therefore, the defense decided not to call the expert
as a witness.
4
Prior to trial, however, the prosecution sought a ruling allowing it
to call the defense-retained expert to the stand. The trial court denied
the prosecution's request, and the case proceeded to trial. A mistrial
was declared when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
5
Prior to the second trial, the trial court reversed its decision regard-
ing the prosecution's use of the expert. The court allowed the prosecu-
tion to use the defense's expert in its case-in-chief, and at the second
trial, the defendant was found guilty on all counts.
6
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's decision in
i. 742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987).
2. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2-201, 18-5-103 (1986).
3. 742 P.2d at 877.
4. Id. at 877-78.
5. Id. at 878.
6. Id. at 878-79.
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an unpublished decision. 7 However, in a precedent setting decision, the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed and held that the prosecution's use
of the defense-retained expert in its case-in-chief violated the defend-
ant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Expansion of Prosecutorial Discovery
The issues presented in Hutchinson arose out of a modem trend per-
mitting and expanding prosecutorial discovery of a defendant's case.
Such discovery was once believed to be barred by the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Under this privilege, the prosecution
was required to carry the burden of proof without any assistance from
the defendant.9
Relatively recent judicial and legislative actions radically altered
those traditional views. Liberal discovery procedures on both sides of a
criminal case are now an accepted means of encouraging and promoting
the truth-seeking process.1°
1. Discovery under the Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 16 of the Federal and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
have had a profound impact on prosecutorial discovery. I I Both rules
afford the prosecution fairly broad discovery rights.
If the defendant has requested discovery, the federal rule permits
the prosecution to obtain documents and tangible objects in the defend-
ant's possession or control which the defendant intends to introduce
into evidence at trial. 12 The federal rule also allows discovery of any
results or reports of examinations and tests made in connection with the
case. 13
The Colorado rule is somewhat broader than its federal counterpart
and does not contain the express limitations set forth in the federal
rule. 14 The state rule permits prosecutorial discovery of medical and
7. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the court of appeals relied on People
v. Perez, 701 P.2d 104 (Colo. App. 1985), in upholding the trial judge's decision to allow a
prosecutor to use a defense expert.
8. 742 P.2d at 876.
9. See generally Allis, Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in Federal
Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1977); Nakell, Criminal Discovery
for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv.
437, 479-81 (1972); Van Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incimina-
lion: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 855 (1977).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16; People v. District Ct., 187
Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
11. See infra note 14.
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(B).
14. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II does not contain a reciprocal requirement nor does it
contain an express provision precluding discovery of defense counsel's work product.




scientific reports made in connection with the case,1 5 the nature of any
defense which the defendant intends to use at trial,' 6 and notice of an
alibi defense, along with the names and addresses of any supporting wit-
nesses.1 7 The rule has survived constitutional attack and has been her-
alded as an effective means of removing the "cloak of secrecy" from the
criminal justice process. 18
2. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has not decided if the prosecu-
tion's use in its case-in-chief of a defense-retained expert violates the
defendant's constitutional rights. However, in several cases, the Court
has expressed its approval of increased prosecutorial discovery under
certain circumstances.
In Williams v. Florida,19 the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a Florida notice-of-alibi statute which required a defendant, who
intended to rely on an alibi defense, to provide information to the pros-
ecution regarding the time and place of the alibi and the names and
addresses of any supporting witnesses. 20 In holding that the rule did
not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court reasoned that, at most, the rule only accelerated the timing of the
defendant's disclosure of an alibi defense.
2 1
The Court maintained that the adversary system is not an end in
itself and "is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute
right always to conceal their cards until played."'2 2 Hence, the Court
approved the Florida rule as a means of enhancing the search for truth,
providing both the defendant and the prosecution ample opportunity to
investigate crucial facts of the case.
2 3
In a separate opinion, Justice Black strongly argued that the notice-
of-alibi rule violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 24 Justice Black adhered to the traditional view that the prosecution
must carry the entire burden of proof without any assistance from the
defendant. He stated that the defendant has an absolute right to remain
silent, "in effect challenging the State at every point to: 'Prove it!'- 25
In the 1973 Wardius v. Oregon 2 6 decision, the Court again consid-
ered the constitutionality of a notice-of-alibi rule. In this case, the Court
held that an Oregon alibi rule was unconstitutional under the due pro-
15. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(b).
16. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 11(c).
17. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 If(d).
18. People v. District Ct., 187 Colo. 333, 338, 531 P.2d 626, 629 (1975).
19. 399 U.S. 78 (1970), affg, 224 So,2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
20. 399 U.S. at 78.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 82.
23. Id. The Court noted that the Florida notice-of-alibi rule was "carefully hedged
with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant." Id. at 81.
24. Id. at 106-16 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 112 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). revk, 6 Or. App. 391, 487 P.2d 1380 (1971).
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cess clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 7 because it required the de-
fendant to disclose alibi information, but did not give the defendant
reciprocal discovery rights. 28 The Court maintained that it would be
fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to divulge information of
his case while subjecting him to possible surprises from the prosecution
regarding the information he disclosed. 29 Nonetheless, the Court again
expressed its approval of liberal discovery procedures as a "salutary de-
velopment which . . . enhances the fairness of the adversary system,"
and stated that discovery must usually be a two-way street.
30
Finally, in the 1975 United States v. Nobles3 ' decision, the Supreme
Court held that defense counsel could be compelled to disclose relevant
portions of a defense investigator's report after counsel had introduced
limited portions of the report in order to impeach prosecution wit-
nesses.3 2 The Court determined that the fifth amendment did not bar
disclosure of the report since the privilege is personal to the defendant
and does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties.
3 3
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, disclosure was not prohibited by the
work product doctrine, as the defense waived the privilege by electing to
call the investigator as a witness.
34
The Court addressed, in a footnote, the defendant's claim that his
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.
3 5
The basis of the claim was that disclosure of the defense investigator's
report compromised counsel's ability to thoroughly investigate and pre-
pare for the case, impaired the relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween the client and attorney, and inhibited counsel from gathering
important information. The Court rejected the claim, maintaining that
the defense voluntarily elected to make testimonial use of the investiga-
tor's report. The discovery order was also limited to relevant portions
of the report.3 6 While the Court dispensed with the claim, at least one
commentator has argued that Nobles laid the foundation for a sixth




Colorado courts have also followed the United States Supreme
Court trend of allowing increased prosecutorial discovery. In People v.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
28. 412 U.S. at 472.
29. Id. at 476.
30. Id. at 474-75. The Court stated, however, that if there is any imbalance in discov-
ery rights, it should work in the defendant's favor. Id. at 475-76 n.9 (quoting Note,
Prosecutorial Discovery under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1018-19 (1972)).
31. 422 U.S. 225 (1975), revg, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. 422 U.S. at 227-29.
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 238-39.
35. Id. at 240 n.15.
36. Id.
37. See Blumenson, Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 122, 175 (1983).
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District Court 38 decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Rule 16
of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure is constitutionally valid on
its face. In examining the breadth and scope of the rule, the court deter-
mined that while the rule recognizes that the prosecution has a right to
discovery, the court will not grant discovery if it forces the defendant to
relinquish his right to obtain' discovery or disclose information which
will not be used at trial.39 The court emphasized that limitless discovery
might be unconstitutional and that a trial court ruling on a prosecution's
discovery request must first decide if the discovery would violate the de-
fendant's rights.
40
In the 1981 decision of People v. Small,4 1 the Colorado Supreme
Court reached a similar decision as the United States Supreme Court
reached in Nobles.4 2 In Small, the court ruled that it was proper for the
prosecution to use a defense investigator's report after defense counsel
introduced at trial limited portions of the report. The court held that
neither the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination nor the de-
fendant's privilege under the work product doctrine were violated.
43
The court adhered to the modern view that criminal discovery promotes
accuracy and efficiency in the fact-finding process and should not be a
"one-way street flowing in the direction of the defense."'4 4
The cases discussed above clearly illustrate that courts are allowing
increased discovery in criminal cases.4 5 However, their desire to liber-
alize discovery must be balanced against the constitutional privileges af-
forded to defendants.
B. Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery
1. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Courts once widely accepted that the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination barred prosecutorial discovery. 4 6 Today the privilege
does not automatically preclude prosecutorial discovery. The privilege
does, however, remain a very powerful constitutional limitation on the
permissible boundaries of prosecutorial discovery. In People v. District
Courl,4 7 for example, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that the
prosecution's discovery requests must be denied if they require a de-
fendant to relinquish his right against self-incrimination.
4 8
38. 187 Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
39. 187 Colo. at 341, 531 P.2d at 630.
40. Id. at 343, 531 P.2d at 632.
41. 631 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101 (1981).
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. 631 P.2d at 158-59.
44. Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
45. See also Annotation, Right of Prosecution to Discovery of Case-Related Notes, Statements,
and Reports-State Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 799 (1983) (for a collection of state cases regarding
prosecution's right to discovery in a criminal case).
46. See supra note 13.
47. 187 Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
48. Id. at 341, 531 P.2d at 630.
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The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the prosecution's use of
a defense-retained expert violates the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. In both People v. Rosenthal4 9 and People v. Roark,50 the
court ruled that the prosecution could not call as a witness in its case-in-
chief a psychiatrist retained by the defendant in order to obtain incrimi-
nating admissions made by the defendant during a pretrial sanity inves-
tigation. 51 In Rosenthal, the court recognized that such a result would
deter the cooperation and candidness necessary for effective diagnosis,
which might in turn, adversely affect the reliability of opinion evidence
in the fact finding process.
52
The defendant in Hutchinson argued that the prosecution's use of
handwriting samples obtained by the defense-retained expert and its
testimonial use of the defense expert violated his privilege against self-
incrimination. 53 However, handwriting samples are considered an iden-
tifying physical characteristic, and not within the privilege. 54 Statements
of third-party witnesses, such as an expert, also do not come within the
privilege. 55 Although the privilege against self-incrimination protects
the defendant from certain prosecutorial discovery, the court in Hutchin-
son did not rely on the self-incrimination privilege, in reaching its
decision.
2. The Work Product Doctrine
In some cases, the work product doctrine is another limitation
which may provide protection from prosecutorial discovery. The doc-
trine provides a limited and qualified privilege against pretrial discovery
of documents and tangible items prepared in anticipation of litigation.
56
Courts have recognized that while the work product doctrine is pri-
marily intended to protect the work product of the attorney, it also ex-
tends to the attorney's agents. 5 7 As the Supreme Court reasoned in
Nobles, one of the realities of litigation is that attorneys must rely on
investigators and other agents in preparation for trial. This requires
protecting materials prepared by the agent as well as by the attorney.
5 8
In Hutchinson, the defendant argued that disclosure of handwriting
samples, as well as testimonial statements, opinions and conclusions of
the defense expert, violated the privilege afforded by the work product
49. 617 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1980).
50. 643 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1982).
51. 617 P.2d at 555; 643 P.2d at 769.
52. 617 P.2d at 556.
53. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 21-25, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
54. See, e.g., People v. District Ct., 187 Colo. 333, 340, 531 P.2d 626, 630 (1975).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975); People v. Small, 631
P.2d 148, 158, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); A. v. District Court, 191 Colo.
10, 550 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Nobles, 422 U.S. at 225 (1975).
58. Id. at 238.
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doctrine.59 However, the court did not extend the privilege to the in-
stant case since handwriting examples are not privileged nor
confidential. 60
3. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege provides another significant limitation
upon prosecutorial discovery.
6 1
Generally, the privilege extends only to confidential communica-
tions made by or to a client in the course of obtaining legal counsel,
advice, or direction.
6 2
Colorado courts have held that the attorney-client privilege may ex-
tend to communications between the client and an agent of the client's
attorney. In Miller v. District Court,63 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that a defense-retained psychiatrist is an agent of defense counsel and
thus comes within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. 6 4 The
court recognized that consultation with an expert, such as a psychiatrist,
is often indispensable in preparing for trial, and reasoned that defense
counsel should not have to run the risk that a defense-retained psychia-
trist might be forced to become an involuntary witness for the
prosecution.
6 5
Although the court based its holding on the attorney-client privi-
lege, its rationale bordered on an effective assistance of counsel analysis.
The court was concerned that allowing the prosecution's use of a de-
fense-retained expert would endanger counsel's ability to represent his
client.6 6 Some courts have, in fact, recognized that there is often a fine
line between the effective representation by counsel and the attorney-
client privilege. For example, in State v. Mingo,6 7 discussed in-depth in
the following section, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a result
similar to that reached by the court in Hutchinson. In discussing the
claims involving violation of the defendant's attorney-client privilege
and right to effective assistance of counsel, the court stated that it re-
garded such rights as related, and furthermore, are used to promote
criminal defendant's rights. 6 8
The attorney-client privilege is limited and its scope, with respect to
defense-retained experts, remains somewhat uncertain at this time.
While the court in Hutchinson acknowledged application of the attorney-
59. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 26-27, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
60. Id. at 21-25.
61. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1987); Law Offices of
Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Colo. 1982).
63. 737 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987).
64. Id. at 838.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 838-39.
67. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978), aff'g, 143 N.J. Super. 411, 363 A.2d 369 (1976).
68. 77 N.J. at 584, 392 A.2d at 594.
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client privilege in similar circumstances, 69 the court chose not to ad-
dress its application in the instant case. The court chose instead to base
its decision on the right to effective assistance of counsel.
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
The court first examined the scope of the right to assistance of
counsel as set forth in both the Colorado Constitution and the United
States Constitution. 70 The court stated that the right to counsel, which
is interpreted as the right to effective assistance of counsel, is a funda-
mental component of the criminal justice system. It affects the defend-
ant's ability to assert other rights he may have, and ultimately affects the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
7 1
The right to effective assistance of counsel imposes certain affirma-
tive duties upon defense counsel, including a duty of loyalty to the cli-
ent, a duty to consult with the client, and a duty to inform the client of
important developments in the case. 72 Counsel's duty to adequately in-
vestigate his client's case is of paramount importance. This is largely
because without adequate pre-trial investigation of the factual and legal
issues, assistance of counsel is rendered virtually ineffective.
7 3
The court recognized that adequate pretrial investigation and prep-
aration often requires consultation with an expert, which as the court
emphasized, may not only be desirable but "absolutely vital." 7 4 The
court stressed that the effectiveness of an expert's assistance is depen-
dent in large part upon a relationship of trust, loyalty and confidentiality
between the expert and the defendant. 75 Such a relationship promotes
a full and frank exchange, which better enables counsel to honestly and
accurately assess his client's case. 76 Supporting this reasoning is the
court's reference to statements made by the handwriting expert who tes-
tified that he attempted to establish a working relationship with the de-
fendant by first sending a letter of introduction and then later assuring
the defendant that he represented the defense counsel and was on his
side.
77
Recognizing that the assistance of an expert may be a crucial ele-
ment of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the court determined
that the prosecution should not be permitted to intrude upon the expert
and defense relationship as it might inhibit or deter counsel from con-
sulting with an expert. The court maintained that permitting such a re-
sult would only marginally promote the truth seeking function of the
69. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 884 (Colo. 1987).
70. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71. 742 P.2d at 880.
72. Id. at 881.
73. Id. (quoting People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 421-22, 514 P.2d 69, 71 (1973)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 882.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 879.
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system while severely damaging defense counsel's ability to provide ef-
fective assistance.
78
The court found support for its decision from two cases in other
jurisdictions. In State v. Mingo,79 the Supreme Court of NewJersey held
that the prosecution's use of a defense-retained handwriting expert in a
rape case violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.80 As in the instant case, the defense decided not to call the expert
as a witness, even though the state was fully capable of retaining its own
expert.8 1 The court in Mingo stressed that defense counsel must be per-
mitted full investigative latitude in developing his client's case, which
should not be restricted by providing the state with damaging
information.
8 2
Similarly, in United States v. Alvarez,8 3 the Third Circuit held that the
prosecution's use of a defense-retained psychiatrist in a competency
proceeding violated the defendant's "sixth amendment attorney-client
privilege."8 4 As in Mingo, the court determined that defense counsel
must be free to make an informed judgment with respect to retaining an
expert without running the risk of creating a potential government
witness.
85
In Hutchinson, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that its
holding is of a limited nature and does not extend to rebuttal of experts
or of non-expert witnesses.8 6 The court maintained that claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel must usually be considered on a case-by-
case basis and that a showing of prejudice is required to warrant relief.
8 7
The court adopted the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,88 which
requires a court to determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the improper use of the witness, the fact-finder would have a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
8 9
Applying those standards to the instant case, the court determined
that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not
have been convicted, but for the prosecution's use of the defense-re-
tained handwriting expert.9 0 It found that the defendant had not waived
his right to effective assistance of counsel, that the defendant was not
78. Id. at 882.
79. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978).
80. 77 N.J. at 587, 392 A.2d at 595. As the Hutchinson court notes, however, the pros-
ecution's use of the defense expert was harmless error as the expert's testimony was cumu-
lative. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 883 n.3.
81. 77 N.J. at 580-81, 392 A.2d at 591-92.
82. Id. at 582, 392 A.2d at 592.
83. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 1046-47. The Hutchinson court states that the holding in Alvarez is based
upon the "Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege" as the Alvarez court essentially sub-
sumed the two claims. Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 883.
85. 519 F.2d at 1036, 1047 (quoted in Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 883).
86. 742 P.2d at 885-86.
87. Id. at 886.
88. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
89. 742 P.2d at 886 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
90. Id. at 887.
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uncooperative with the prosecution's experts while assisting the de-
fense's experts, and that the defense's expert testimony was damag-
ing.9 1 Also, there was no compelling justification for the prosecution's
use of the defense expert as there was no indication that the prosecution
was unable to retain its own competent expert. 92 Hence, the court re-




In the dissenting opinion, Justice Vollack argued that the case could
have been decided under Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the attorney-client privilege, 94 thus avoiding construc-
tion of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Jus-
tice Vollack argued that the defense expert's report was discoverable
under Rule 16 and that the prosecution's use of the expert did not vio-
late the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the defendant's rights
were protected because the trial court limited the expert's testimony by




Prosecutorial discovery is a relatively recent development in crimi-
nal law and courts will continue to confront new and different issues
regarding the breadth and scope of permissable discovery. Today many
of the limitations which have traditionally afforded the defendant some
measure of protection have greatly diminished and are often ineffective
barriers to broad discovery requests.
In response to the trend toward greater prosecutorial discovery, the
court in Hutchinson applied what is also a developing trend in criminal
law - the theory that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel can provide a constitutional basis which precludes the prose-
cution's use of a defense-retained expert in certain circumstances. The
theory is not completely novel, but merely a logical extension of the
Mingo96 and Alvarez 97 decisions.
The right to effective assistance imposes certain affirmative duties
upon defense counsel, such as the duty to adequately prepare for and
investigate the client's case. 98 Realistically, however, factors external to
the conduct and performance of defense counsel may adversely affect
counsel's ability to provide effective assistance. For example, in Hutchin-
91. Id. at 886-87.
92. Id. at 887.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 887 (Vollack, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 888-91 (Vollack, J., dissenting).
96. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978).
97. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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son, such a factor was the conduct of the prosecution. While it is essen-
tial that the prosecution obtain the necessary facts of the case, the
prosecution should not be permitted to undermine defense counsel's
efforts to fulfill his duties and responsibilities to his client. In Hutchinson,
the court has taken a positive step forward in ensuring that the defend-
ant is afforded his constitutional rights.
Perhaps the ultimate strength of the opinion is the limited holding.
The court has not created a per se rule which prohibits the disclosure and
use of a defense-retained expert. Instead, the court maintained that
cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must focus on
the facts of the individual case, and must show prejudice to the defend-
ant resulting from the violation in order to obtain relief. The decision
also requires a court, in determining whether the prosecution's use of
the defense expert is justified, to determine if a compelling justification
exists. 99 In Hutchinson, there was no compelling justification for the
prosecution's use of the defense-retained handwriting expert. However,
the court's decision does not in any way foreclose the possibility that a
compelling justification may indeed mandate a different result.
In its Petition for Rehearing,10 0 the prosecution argued that the
court's decision has turned the sixth amendment right to effective assist-
ance of counsel on its head and that the expansive nature of the decision
has startling implications. 10 ' Ironically, the prosecution presented two
hypotheticals which, instead of illustrating the potential flaws of the
opinion, tended to reinforce its strength. In one hypothetical, the pros-
ecution raised the issue that if it learned of the consistencies between
the spelling errors made by the defendant and by the forger, and subse-
quently conducted an additional examination to confirm such evidence,
the defendant could challenge the admissibility of the subsequently de-
rived evidence as it was the fruit of the prosecution's "violation of his
sixth amendment right to consult and silence his experts."' 0 2 The facts
presented by the hypothetical clearly do not come within the protection
afforded under Hutchinson. Hutchinson does not extend to evidence ob-
tained through an independent examination conducted by an expert in-
dependently consulted by the prosecution. Instead, it focuses on the
prosecution's direct use of a defense-retained expert in its case-in-chief.
The fact that the prosecution's subsequent investigation reveals the
same information as a prior defense investigation, does not in any way
violate the rule set forth in Hutchinson.
The prosecution presented another hypothetical which involved ac-
tions concerning drunk driving.' 0 3 The prosecution hypothesized that
if a defense-retained expert happens to conduct an examination of the
defendant's blood or breath sample, the prosecution may later be pre-
99. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
100. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
101. Record at 2-3, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987) (No. 85SC510).
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
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cluded from presenting any evidence regarding the defendant's state of
intoxication. 10 4 However, if the only evidence as to the defendant's in-
toxication is the sample preserved and examined by a defense-retained
expert, then there is a compelling justification for the prosecution's use
of both the information obtained by the defense expert himself and also
the use of the defense expert himself.
While the court has created a constitutional basis precluding the
prosecution's use of a defense expert in its case-in-chief, the decision
imposes sufficient limitations. These limitations effectively alleviate any
abuse or injustice which might otherwise result.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hutchinson, the court expanded the traditional concepts of the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Since its inception, the Constitu-
tion has been subject to a considerable amount of interpretation and
expansion, some of-which has been positive and some negative. The
court's decision in Hutchinson is manifestly positive, as it affords the de-
fendant a constitutional shield from what is already an overwhelming
arsenal of prosecutorial power. ' 0 5 In the dissenting opinion set forth in
Williams v. Florida,'0 6 Justice Black maintained that the Bill of Rights,
taken as a whole, is "designed to shield the defendant against state
power," and although this undeniably makes the prosecution's job much
more difficult, this principal is imperative to ensure that the defendant is
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